Mandatory Student Fees: First Amendment Concerns and University Discretion by Wells, Christina E.
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
1988
Mandatory Student Fees: First Amendment
Concerns and University Discretion
Christina E. Wells
University of Missouri School of Law, wellsc@missouri.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Education Law Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation






[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propa-
gation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors is sinful and ty-
rannical. .... I
[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the ex-
pression of opinions that we loathe ....
The freedom to associate or not to associate with any particu-
lar idea or group has firm roots in the first amendment. Similarly,
the idea that the first amendment protects abhorrent speech has a
long history. Recently, these two doctrines have come into play
and, at times, into apparent conflict in debates over the constitu-
tionality of mandatory student fees at public3 universities.
Universities levy fees on students in order to fund a variety of
student groups and services ranging from athletics to student gov-
ernment to politically active student groups such as a student
newspaper 4 or a Public Interest Research Group ("PIRG").5 In
general, students pay these fees with little thought as to how the
fees will be used and most students, if not all, would not withhold
the money used to fund school athletics and general services. How-
t B.A. 1985, University of Kansas; J.D. Candidate 1988, The University of Chicago.
I Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 545 (1950).
' Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting).
3 Because of the state action doctrine, constitutional guarantees of human rights are
effective only against action which is "fairly attributable to the State." Lugar v. Edmunson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Since it is questionable whether private universities are
subject to constitutional restraint, this Comment considers first amendment rights solely in
the context of a state university.
4 See, e.g., Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983)(approximately 20 percent of
student fees used to fund school newspaper).
5 See, e.g., Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985)(student fee assessed under
neutral funding policy and used to fund the New Jersey PIRG, a political advocacy group).
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ever, conflict has arisen over fees used to fund politically active or
ideological organizations whose ideas are repugnant to some stu-
dents.' In protest, these students allege that the use of mandatory
fees violates their freedoms of association and speech because it
compels them to support ideas that they dislike.
In response, university officials, among others, contend that
mandatory fees are necessary to ensure that all student groups
may contribute to the total university exchange of ideas. The pro-
ponents of this theory contend that the university setting is
designed to instill in students enlightened thought, and that the
university's unique character supports its discretion to compel the
payment of student fees.
This Comment analyzes the constitutional issues raised by the
use of mandatory student fees to fund speech at public universi-
ties. Part I examines the interests of students and universities with
respect to the use of such fees. Part II examines court decisions in
this area. Part III looks to the nature of student fees and demon-
strates that they are permissible exercises of university discretion.
Parts IV and V discuss whether the Constitution requires a univer-
sity, if it funds student organizations by mandatory fees, to fund
all organizations equally, without regard to other students' objec-
tions to those organizations' viewpoints.
I. STUDENT AND UNIVERSITY INTERESTS
A. Students' Right Not to Associate
The student objectors' assertion that universities cannot com-
pel them to fund organizations whose ideas they find repugnant
relies on the first amendment freedom of association. Although the
freedom to associate is not expressly set out in the first amend-
ment, the Supreme Court has regarded it as implicit in the free-
' See Galda, 772 F.2d 1060 (students objecting to use of special fee to fund political
advocacy group); Kania, 702 F.2d 475 (students objecting to fee used to fund school newspa-
per voicing opinions with which they disagreed); Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F.Supp. 1348
(M.D.N.C. 1974)(students objecting to funding of student newspaper); Veed v.
Schwartzkopf, 353 F.Supp. 149 (D.Neb. 1973) (objection to funding of student newspaper,
student government association and speaker series); Larson v. Board of Regents of Univer-
sity of Neb., 189 Neb. 688, 204 N.W.2d 568 (1973)(objection to funding of student newspa-
per, student association, and speaker group); Good v. Associated Students of University of
Washington, 86 Wash.2d 94, 542 P.2d 762 (1975) (objection to funding of politically active
student group); Lace v. University of Vermont, 131 Vt. 170, 303 A.2d 475 (1973) (objection
to funding of speakers series, student newspaper, certain student government expenses, and
certain films).
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doms of speech, assembly, and petition.' Although the freedom to
associate is the more commonly touted right, it carries with it an
equally important right not to associate.
An individual's right to refrain from associating with or ex-
pressing views with which she disagrees was best voiced by the Su-
preme Court in Board of Education v. Barnette." The Court stated
that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be or-
thodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." In
Barnette, the Court considered the constitutionality of a school
board resolution requiring all students to salute and pledge alle-
giance to the United States flag.10 In reaching its conclusion that
individuals should be free from compulsion "to declare a belief,"
the Supreme Court recognized that "[c]ompulsory unification of
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."'1 The Bar-
nette principle has gained general acceptance and has been applied
by the Supreme Court in several other contexts.2 Most recently,
' The first amendment's core protection of the right to speak protects the right to asso-
ciate oneself with ideas, since speech itself serves to associate its speaker with the ideas she
espouses. The Court has further recognized that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and
private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group as-
sociation." N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (holding that under the circum-
stances the state could not compel the NAACP to disclose its membership list because such
disclosure would abridge the right of NAACP members to band together to promote their
views). The Court thus has held that the first amendment protects the freedom to associate
oneself with other people as a predicate to vindication of the right to speak.
9 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
9 Id. at 642.
1* The West Virginia State Board of Education had required all pupils and teachers to
participate in the salute, stating that refusal to do so would result in expulsion. 319 U.S. at
626. The objecting students were Jehovah's Witnesses whose religious beliefs forbade them
from worshipping "any graven image" and who considered the flag to be an "image" within
the meaning of this command. The Court held that the issue did not turn upon the religious
views of the students. Id. at 634.
11 Id. at 641. As with the right to associate, the right not to associate may apply both to
ideas and other people. See note 7. The line of cases founded upon Barnette protects the
right not to associate with an idea. On the freedom not to associate oneself with a group of
other people, see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a patronage
system which forced a city employed process server and a city employed bailiff to support
and affiliate themselves with the Democratic Party in order to retain their jobs).
" See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (order
that a utility must apportion space in its billing envelope between itself and rival citizens
groups who wished to submit editorial notices violated utility's rights of expression and as-
sociation); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state's requirement that license plate
bear motto, "Live Free or Die," violated plaintiff's right not to associate with speech he
considered repugnant); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Flor-
ida "right to reply" statute forcing newspaper to allow equal space to a candidate to respond
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this principle has been extended to forced payment of union
"agency-shop" fees, parts of which are later used to fund expres-
sion of political or ideological views.' 3 In a line of cases extending
from Machinists v. Street,14 through Railway Clerks v. Allen,"6 to
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,6 the Court has considered
whether unions may use portions of a mandatory agency-shop fee
to fund political candidates or certain ideological views. In Street
and Allen, the Court invalidated such expenditures on statutory
rather than constitutional grounds 7 but some justices voiced the
opinion that it was constitutionally impermissible to allow such ex-
penditures. 8 Finally, in Abood, the Court addressed the constitu-
tional issues that it previously had avoided.
As with the previous cases, the controversy in Abood centered
on the expenditure of agency-shop fees for political purposes. The
plaintiffs refused to pay these fees, claiming that they were used
for political, ideological, and religious activities unrelated to the
union's position as collective bargaining agent. According to the
plaintiffs, such expenditures violated their freedom not to associate
by compelling them to support views they found distasteful. 9 The
Court agreed and ruled that the union's expenditures on political
activities unrelated to its position as exclusive bargaining represen-
tative must be funded by contributions voluntarily paid by em-
ployees. The Court refused to countenance what it deemed "com-
pulsory subsidization of ideological activity."2
to criticism violated constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and association).
" An agency shop is a "union-security device whereby, in order to continue employ-
ment, any nonunion member employee is required to pay to the Union sums equivalent to
those paid by union members ... ." Black's Law Dictionary 58 (5th ed. 1979).
14 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
373 U.S. 113 (1963).
18 431 U.S. 209(1977).
' In Street and Allen, the Court did not address the constitutional issues because it
construed the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §152, Eleventh (1982) to deny the union author-
ity to make expenditures to support political or ideological views against an agency-shop
member's objections. Street, 367 U.S. at 770; Allen, 373 U.S. at 118.
18 See, e.g., Street, 367 U.S. at 791 (Black dissenting) (in authorizing application of the
union-shop contract to employees who object to the union's use of dues for political pur-
poses, Railway Labor Act violates objectors' freedom to associate).
19 431 U.S. at 213. The exact nature of the activities and the dissenting employees'
objections were not described in detail. Id. at 213 n.3.
20 Id. at 237. The Court equated compelled financial support for a particular view with
prohibitions on support for ideological activity:
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from mak-
ing, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their constitu-
tional rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual
should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be
[55:363
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The Court limited its bar on compulsory funding to those ex-
penditures that were not germane to the union's collective bargain-
ing role.21 The principle that can be drawn from Abood is not that
unions are forbidden to use mandatory dues to fund political
speech; rather, unions may not use mandatory dues to fund politi-
cal speech substantially unrelated to the union's core purpose.2
Presumably then, if the union were to use its dues to help fund an
organization that lobbied on behalf of union members, the expend-
itures would not offend the first amendment.
Students objecting to the use of mandatory fees as a means of
funding political and ideological student organizations sometimes
rely on the Abood decision to support their claims.23 As members
of the university requiring the payment of student fees to fund
speech, these students contend that they are in a position similar
to the members of an agency-shop; consequently, they call for pro-
tection against associational infringements in a manner similar to
the Abood case. They argue that a university's mission is educa-
tional; as such, fees levied upon students should be used only to
support organizations compatible with that mission. Funds used to
support political or ideological speech violate the Abood test be-
cause the university does not use those funds for purposes germane
to the university's stated function.
B. University Interest In the Free Exchange of Ideas
Universities argue that they have a significant interest in man-
shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.
Id. at 234-35 (footnotes omitted).
21 Id. at 225-26 ("insofar as the service charge is used to finance expenditures by the
Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance ad-
justment. . .[previous] decisions of this Court appear to require validation of the agency-
shop agreement before us"). Justice Douglas earlier had suggested this theory in his concur-
ring opinion in Street, 367 U.S. at 778 ("As long as. . .[the union leaders] act to promote
the cause which justified bringing the group together, the individual cannot withdraw his
financial support merely because he disagrees with the group's strategy."). The Court in
Abood recognized that its decision would create difficult line drawing problems between
"collective-bargaining activities" and "ideological activities unrelated to collective bargain-
ing." 431 U.S. at 236.
22 See Laurence H.Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-4 n.5 (1978)("The decision
in Abood did not uphold any right of a non-member to withhold contributions from the cost
of communicative activities with which the non-member disagrees, so long as such activities
are germane to the union's duties as collective bargaining representative.").
23 In only two cases have students relied directly on the Abood decision. See Galda, 772
F.2d at 1063; Kania, 702 F.2d at 478. However, in pre-Abood cases, students relied on
Abood's precursors, Street and Allen, or on identical theories. See generally Arrington, 380
F.Supp. 1348; Veed, 353 F.Supp. 1149; Good, 542 P.2d 762; Larson, 204 N.W.2d 568.
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dating student fees. The university atmosphere, school officials
claim, is peculiarly "the marketplace of ideas. ' 24 By using fees to
fund student groups, the university ensures that a variety of
groups will participate in the overall exchange of ideas. In creating
this marketplace, the university fulfills its duty "to provide that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment
and creation."25
The concept of the marketplace of ideas stems from basic first
amendment tenets. Theoretically, this marketplace facilitates soci-
ety's search for truth.26 Historically, the university was founded on
principles of reason and freedom of thought; thus, many have rea-
soned that the promotion of the marketplace of ideas is especially
important in the university environment. Allan Bloom aptly de-
scribes this conception:
[The university exists] for the sake of democracy and for the
sake of preserving the freedom of the mind. . . for some indi-
viduals within it. The successful university is the proof that a
society can be devoted to the well-being of all, without stunt-
ing human potential or imprisoning the mind to the goals of
the regime.27
Thus, the university's purpose is to enlighten students as to oppos-
ing views so that they might learn ultimate truths.
Exposure to conflicting views is not only educative generally; it
also imbues in students a capacity for tolerance. In The Tolerant
Society, Lee Bollinger argues that the institution of free speech is
coercive because it enforces a tolerance in people by compelling
them to confront abhorrent speech and their impulse to suppress
it; it forces them to exercise self-control.28 Such teachings of toler-
24 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
25 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter concurring), quot-
ing Statement of the Conference of Senior Scholars from University of Cape Town and
University of Wittersrand, The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12.
26 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting) ("the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market").
27 Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind 252 (1987)("American Mind").
28 See Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society 126-31, 143 (1986). Bollinger explains the
significance of the tolerant mind this way:
[T]he impulse [of intolerance] threatens all behavior. Everyone who is perceived as
being different, as having different values or beliefs or an interest in a different way of
life, is a potential victim of an excess of this impulse. Besides members of religious
groups, the most common victims of such intolerance are those of different races or
nationalities .... [T]he basic operation of a self-governing political society ... [in-
volves] a willingness to compromise and a willingness even to accept total defeat ....
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ance not only are desirable, but also may be essential because "of
the dependence of a free society on free universities."2 9
According to school officials, the university promotes the mar-
ketplace of ideas not only in the classroom but also by creating a
forum of widely divergent student groups.30 Student fees used to
fund such groups creates a forum of "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" expression.3 1 Student participation in student organi-
zation speech activities, moreover, is itself an important learning
experience. Consequently, universities feel that any incidental lim-
itation on student dissenters' rights is justified.
C. The Possibility of Alternative Systems
One could accommodate the student objections by using a dif-
ferent funding system. For example, rather than funding all quali-
fied student organizations, a university could subsidize none of
these groups. All student organizations would be funded through
voluntary donations. Some commentators favor this system 2 and a
few universities use it.33 Similarly, a university could use a refund
system that would allow a student to indicate that she did not wish
to support a particular group, thereby enabling her to obtain a
refund. 4
While these alternatives accommodate the dissenting students,
[Tolerance thus] bears a special relevance to the actual functioning of a democratic
system of government.
Id. at 111, 117-18.
29 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (Frankfurter concurring). See also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250
(majority opinion) ("essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident"); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("Our Nation
is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all
of us and not merely to the teachers concerned"). Bloom notes that "the ... universities
are the core of liberal democracy, its foundation, the repository of its animating princi-
ples .... The free university exists only in liberal democracy, and liberal democracies exist
only where there are free universities." Bloom, American Mind at 259 (cited in note 27).
30 See, e.g., Veed, 353 F.Supp. at 152 (university officials argued that extracurricular
groups were as much a part of the educational process as were classroom teachings).
31 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
32 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-4 n.5 (cited in note 22). In speaking of
mandatory fees in the Abood context, Professor Tribe suggests that "[a] better solution
might well be to require ideological activities . . . to be financed from voluntary
contributions. . ....
22 Approximately 10 percent of universities do not appropriate money to student
groups either from mandatory fees or directly from their budget. David L. Meabon, Robert
E. Alexander and Katherine E. Hunter, Student Activity Fees 20-33 (1979).
3' Abood is often cited as supporting this proposition. See, e.g., Association of Capitol
Powerhouse v. Division of Building, 89 Wash.2d 177, 570 P.2d 1042, 1049 (1977). See also
Galda, 772 F.2d 1060, for a discussion of refund systems in the university context.
19881
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they do not fully take into account the universities' interests. At
first, this may seem untrue. Certainly, all student groups still have
the right3 5 and the ability6 to speak on campus regardless of
whether they are funded. Therefore, it may seem that accommoda-
tion of the student dissenters does not infringe upon the universi-
ties' interest in creating a forum for the expression of ideas.37
While the failure to compel fees for these student groups en-
sures that student free association rights are not infringed, the uni-
versity's educative goals certainly are not promoted to their fullest
when funding of such groups is not present. Lack of funding will
reduce the diversity of views expressed, the total quantity of
speech which can be funded, and the opportunity for students to
participate in student organization speech activities. Moreover, a
university's goal to instill in students an active capacity for toler-
ance is undermined when it creates a system where private biases
are allowed to determine who in the forum shall be given the
added advantage of monetary support.38
In sum, universities often feel that they must mandate student
fees if they are to meet their educative goals. That the universities'
goals are legitimate is unquestioned. Rather, the issue is whether a
"' Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), upheld the right of
public school students to wear black armbands to protest United States policy in Vietnam.
The Court stated that "[ilt can hardly be said that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." These
rights were expressly extended to university students in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180
(1972), where the Supreme Court held invalid a university's refusal to allow a group to
organize on campus on the ground that the group's stated views were abhorrent to the uni-
versity. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). For a more extended discussion of
these rights, see Part uI.A.
" This proposition is arguable. Considering the average student's lack of funds, it
seems less likely that groups receiving no university financial support will be able to associ-
ate and speak effectively. See, e.g., Arrington, 380 F.Supp. at 1358 (withdrawal of funds
from student newspaper would impair exchange of ideas).
11 One commentator claims that because there is no actual clash between the two inter-
ests, the argument leans heavily in favor of protecting the students' associational concerns.
See Note, "Fee Speech": First Amendment Limitations on Student Fee Expenditures, 20
Cal.West.L.Rev. 279, 285 (1984).
' The system in which private biases are allowed to determine funding decisions con-
veys a message to students that although the university purports to teach them tolerance, it
is willing to deny the benefits of funding to those groups that students deem intolerable.
Allowing students to decline participation in funding also creates a "free rider" prob-
lem-unless the university reallocates the contested funds to non-speech activities rather
than refunding them to the students. An individual student has little incentive to contribute
to funding a forum for free expression if she receives the benefits of the forum regardless of
whether she contributes. The Court in Abood found this incentive problem an important
reason to allow an agency-shop union to engage in speech related to collective bargaining
even where some of its members disagreed. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
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university can promote these goals to their fullest by using com-
pelled student fees. Consequently, the adequacy of alternative
funding mechanisms will not be considered further in this Com-
ment. Parts II and III of this Comment instead focus on the con-
stitutional permissibility of mandatory fees.
II. A SURVEY OF COURT DECISIONS ON THE PERMISSIBILITY OF
STUDENT FEES
Several courts have heard claims challenging the constitution-
ality of student fees. Almost unanimously' 9 these courts have held
such fees permissible: However, courts have approached this issue
differently and many have ruled in favor of the universities with-
out adequately analyzing the issues involved in these cases.
Some courts have ruled that a university may assess
mandatory fees because the university setting is a "forum" created
for the expression of widely divergent opinions.40 These courts rea-
son that the objecting students are not being forced to associate
with one particular idea because their fees are being used to fund
several opinions. 41 However, different courts have defined the
scope of this forum differently.
In Lace v. University of Vermont 42 the Vermont Supreme
Court applied the forum approach to school activities as a whole.
" Only one court has ruled that an assessment was unconstitutional. See Galda, 772
F.2d at 1068. However, the Galda case can be distinguished from the other mandatory fee
cases since it involved a fee mandated specifically for one group, the New Jersey PIRG. Id.
at 1061. In addition, this group was unusual in that it was a state-wide organization inde-
pendent from the university. As the Galda court recognized, these facts are not present in
fee cases where a single fee is assessed and later distributed to several student groups. Id. at
1064.
The differences between Galda and the other fee cases and the complexities involved
are too numerous to be dealt with here. For commentary on Galda's relationship to the
other fee cases see Note, 20 Cal.West.L.Rev. 279 (cited in note 37); Recent Developments,
Constitutional Law: The First Amendment and Compulsory Funding of Political Advocacy
- Galda v. Rutgers, 9 Harv.J.L. & Pub.Pol'y 731 (1986); Charles Thomas Steele Jr.,
Mandatory Student Fees at Public Universities: Bringing the First Amendment Within the
Campus Gate, 13 J.Col. & Uni.L. 353 (1987).
40 See, e.g., Kania, 702 F.2d at 480; Veed, 353 F.Supp. at 153; Good, 542 P.2d at 768-9;
Larson, 204 N.W.2d at 570-1; Lace, 303 A.2d at 479.
" Generally, student fees are assessed at the beginning of each school term in one lump
sum. These assessments are then placed into a fee pool that is distributed in accordance
with neutral criteria (e.g., a certain dollar amount per member) to qualified student organi-
zations. See, e.g., Lace, 303 A.2d at 476; Larson, 204 N.W.2d at 570; Veed, 353 F.Supp. at
150. Thus, the courts feel that a student is not being forced to associate herself with any
individual ideology; rather she is merely contributing to a monetary pool for all qualified
organizations.
42 131 Vt. 170, 303 A.2d 475 (1973).
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Ruling that "student association funds provide the monetary plat-
form for various and divergent student organizations to inject a
spectrum of ideas into the campus community," the court found
that the assessed fees did not constitute a compelled association.43
The fact that the fees were used to fund many different groups
was, for the court, a sufficient answer to the complaining students'
first amendment attack on mandatory student fees.
The court in Larson v. Board of Regents" took a somewhat
different approach. In Larson, certain students objected to the use
of their fees to fund a student newspaper and a visiting speakers
program. The court rejected the students' claims under a forum
analysis; however, its definition of a forum was much more limited
than that in Lace. "We do not question the right of the university
to furnish partial support for a campus newspaper from the stu-
dent fees, but such a newspaper should not be allowed to become a
vehicle for expressing a single political point of view. '45 In contrast
to the reasoning in Lace, the Larson court's approach suggests that
each individual organization must provide a forum for diverse
views. Thus, groups with a particular political bent or advocacy
groups such as a PIRG are susceptible to student attacks under
this ruling.
Arrington v. Taylor,46 unlike the above examples, turned on
associational concerns rather than on the forum concept. As in
most cases, the controversy arose over the use of student fees to
fund school newspapers; certain students objected to the predomi-
nantly liberal views espoused by the paper. While recognizing that
the paper was a forum for diverse viewpoints, the court concen-
trated mainly on the students' claim that the use of mandatory
student fees to fund the paper violated the students' right not to
associate.47 Ultimately, the court rejected the students' conten-
43 Id. at 479. Other courts have agreed with this analysis. The Kania and Veed courts
applied the forum analysis to student activities as a whole. However, in each case, other
factors also played a large part in the decision. In Veed, the court also focussed on univer-
sity discretion, stating that the university "must retain the freedom and flexibility to put
before their students a broad range of ideas in a variety of contexts." 353 F.Supp. at 153.
The Kania court ruled that "funding by mandatory student fees is the least restrictive
means of accomplishing an important part of the University's central purpose, the education
of its students." 702 F.2d at 480.
" 189 Neb. 688, 204 N.W.2d 568 (1973). See also Good, 542 P.2d at 769 (expressly
approving the Larson court's approach).
45 204 N.W.2d at 571. The court expressed a similar view regarding the speaker pro-
gram. Id.
46 380 F.Supp. 1348 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
In analyzing the associational concerns, the court relied upon Lathrop v. Donahue,
367 U.S. 820 (1961), the then-existing precedent regarding compelled fees and negative asso-
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tions, ruling that because the newspaper did not speak on behalf of
the entire student body, no ideas could be attributed to the ob-
jecting students and, therefore, the university had not compelled
the students to associate with the ideas published in the student
newspaper.48
Although courts applying these differing analyses have re-
jected student contributors' first amendment objections to
mandatory student fees, the disparity in the different courts' ap-
proaches indicates that first amendment doctrine in this area is
unsettled. Here, cases involving similar situations result in conflict-
ing decisions depending upon the approach used by the courts.
Part III examines the constitutional permissibility of mandatory
fees under current Supreme Court doctrine and suggests a uniform
approach to the fee question.
III. MANDATORY STUDENT FEES ARE PERMISSIBLE
This section first demonstrates that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Abood does not preclude mandatory fees. This discussion
then examines three important Supreme Court decisions and
shows that, under their framework, student fees are permissible.
A. Abood: Limitations on the Labor Union Analogy
Arguing that the Abood "reasonably related to the organiza-
tions' core purpose" test applies, students claim that the university
can mandate fees only for those organizations compatible with the
university's educational mission. Thus, those student groups with a
political bent cannot be funded. The student dissenters who rely
on Abood, however, fail to recognize either the obvious differences
between a labor union and a university or the permissibility of
mandatory fees under Abood even if such an analogy is accepted.
The Abood Court held that a union could not require mem-
bers of a collective bargaining unit to pay agency-shop fees where
the union used the fees to fund speech not related to the union's
function as the unit's exclusive bargaining representative and
where some members found that speech repugnant. The student
fees scenario differs from the Abood model because the universities
use mandatory student fees to fund a forum of ideas, not a particu-
ciational rights. Although the court in Lathrop did not actually resolve the associational
issues, several concurring justices attempted to answer this question. The Arrington court
relied especially on Justice Harlan's opinion. Id. at 849.
8 380 F.Supp. at 1362-63.
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lar ideology or a group of students that functions as the exclusive
mouthpiece of the student body. Some lower courts considering the
student fee issue have noted this distinction when ruling against
student dissenters.49
The union situation differs from the university setting in a
second way as well: the justifications for mandating fees in the
union situation are not the same as the justifications for mandating
fees in the student fee situation. Universities mandate student fees
in order to promote a first amendment value, the free exchange of
ideas. Labor law, by contrast, requires each of the members of a
collective bargaining unit to pay labor dues in order to facilitate
labor peace.50 In the university setting, first amendment interests
exist on both sides of the argument-both the student dissenters
and the universities argue that first amendment interests support
their respective positions on the mandatory fee issue. Conse-
quently, the problem of balancing these interests is unlike that in
the union situation, where the first amendment associational inter-
est outweighs the less compelling labor interest.
Even if the imperfect analogy between the union and the uni-
versity is accepted, the Abood test itself does not support the stu-
dent objectors' attack on mandatory student fees. The Court in
Abood ruled that a union cannot fund political speech substan-
tially unrelated to the union's core purpose through mandatory
dues. It did not say that no political speech could be funded. If one
applies this test in the university setting and assumes that the core
purpose of the university is educative (as the student dissenters
assert), the argument against mandatory fees fails.
One cannot say that the political and controversial ideas that
the dissenters dislike are noneducational. Many recognize that
such ideas are educative. 51 Indeed, controversy and dissension are
central to the university model. Certainly this idea was at the core
of one lower court's decision:
When a student enrolls at a university he or she enteres [sic]
See, e.g., Kania, 702 F.2d at 480 (Unlike Abood, the school newspaper did not en-
hance the power of only one group to further its political goals; rather, it increased the
overall exchange of opinions and ideas on campus.). See also Lace, 303 A.2d at 479 (relying
on the Street decision which preceded Abood).
50 See Kania, 702 F.2d at 479 (Abood Court concerned with labor relations in the public
sector, not with the peculiar setting of a student newspaper in a public university).
11 See, e.g., Lace, 303 A.2d at 480 ("fact that certain ideas are controversial . . . does
not automatically make them non-educational"). See also Board of Education v. Pico, 457




an academic community-a world which allows the teaching,
advocacy and dissemination of an infinite range of ideas, theo-
ries and beliefs. They may be controversial or traditional, rad-
ical or conformist. But the university is the arena in which
accepted, discounted-even repugnant-beliefs, opinions and
ideas challenge each other.2
In addition, student participation in student organization speech
activities is itself an important educational experience.
Decisions regarding educational value generally are left to ed-
ucators and are given great deference by the courts53 unless such
decisions are clearly unconstitutional. Therefore, if a university
"adopt[s] as a part of [its] educational process" 511 a program that
promotes the exchange of political or controversial ideas through
extracurricular student organizations, it is difficult to say that such
a program violates the Abood test.
B. PruneYard, Buckley, and Lee: A Uniform Approach to Com-
pelled Fees
1. The PruneYard Analogy-Associational Concerns In the
Forum Context. While most decisions in this area have acknowl-
edged that the forum interests outweigh the associational interests,
few have used a principled basis to make such decisions. No court
has expressly considered the analysis articulated in PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins,"6 where the Supreme Court ruled that
forcing a shopping center owner to allow distribution of leaflets on
his property did not violate his right not to associate.5 7 Signifi-
cantly, PruneYard involved both forum and associational concerns
and therefore is a powerful analogy to the mandatory fee cases.
In PruneYard, the Court considered whether the state could
prevent the owner of a large shopping center from excluding cer-
52 Good, 542 P.2d at 768-69.
Several Supreme Court cases have recognized that decisions of this kind "should be
made by academicians, not by federal judges." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278-79 (Stevens concur-
ring). See also Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (recognizing "the need for affirming the comprehensive
authority of. . .school officials"), quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. Such discretion is also
inherent in the constitutional dimensions of academic freedom. See note 29.
", See Healy, 408 U.S. at 180; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278-79 (Stevens concurring). For
example, the university cannot constitutionally practice viewpoint discrimination. Part V of
this Comment will demonstrate that where viewpoint discrimination is involved, university
discretion is severely limited.
55 Veed, 353 F.Supp. at 152.
56 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
57 While decisions before 1980 could not rely on the PruneYard case, subsequent deci-
sions in Kania, 710 F.2d 475, and Galda, 772 F.2d 1060, did not mention PruneYard.
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tain speakers from his shopping center grounds. The owner had
opened the shopping center to the public in order to encourage pa-
tronage of the center's commercial establishments. The owner
barred visitors or tenants from engaging in publicly expressive ac-
tivities that were not directly related to the shopping center's com-
mercial purpose and enforced this policy in a nondiscriminatory
manner. Pursuant to this policy, the shopping center's security
agents forced certain high school students, soliciting support for
their campaign to oppose a United Nations resolution against Zi-
onism, to leave the PruneYard's premises. 8
The Court accepted the California Supreme Court's determi-
nation that the California Constitution protected "speech and peti-
tioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the
centers are privately owned." 59 The owner contended that, as in-
terpreted, this provision of the California Constitution violated his
first amendment right not to associate because it forced him to use
his property as a forum for the speech of others.6° The Supreme
Court recognized that the right involved was like that in Bar-
nette-the right not to associate with a particular idea. Yet the
Court rejected the owner's contention, citing three reasons why
PruneYard was distinguishable from other negative association
cases:
Most important, the shopping center by choice of its owner is
not limited to the personal use of the appellants. It is instead
a business establishment that is open to the public to come
and go as they please. The views expressed by the members of
the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for
a petition thus will not likely be identified with those of the
owner. Second, no specific message is dictated by the State to
be displayed on appellant's property. There consequently is
no danger of governmental discrimination for or against a par-
ticular message. Finally, as far as appears here appellants can
expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply
posting signs .... 11
Because of these factors, the Court held that the connection be-
tween the owner and the speakers was so attenuated that recogni-
58 447 U.S. at 77.
59 Id. at 78, quoting Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 910, 592
P.2d 341, 347 (1979).
60 Id. at 85.
61 Id. at 87.
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tion of the protestors' right to speak and petition in the complex
did not force the owner to associate himself with a particular
belief.
The PruneYard analysis is particularly helpful in analyzing
students' associational concerns in the mandatory student fee con-
text. First, the university atmosphere is similar to that of the shop-
ping center in PruneYard. Both are forums used by widely diver-
gent groups of people. By creating a forum in which all students
are free to speak, the university has likened itself to a shopping
complex "open to the public to come and go as they please." Under
such conditions, it is unlikely that anyone would attribute a partic-
ular group's speech to any one student.
In Prune Yard, the danger of attribution of ideas was much
greater because the public was aware that one person was responsi-
ble for the shopping center forum: the owner. However, in the uni-
versity situation, people do not attribute certain ideas to individual
students because of the unique public character of the university.
No one owns the university forum; the ideas that emanate from it
can be attributed only to those groups proposing such ideas. Due
to the low risk of attribution in the university fee context, the stu-
dent dissenters in the student fee context are more analogous to
the shopping center owner in PruneYard than the union members
in Abood where the union was the sole mouthpiece of its agency-
shop members.2
Similarly, the second factor in PruneYard applies in the stu-
dent fee context. The state does not dictate a particular message
when a university creates a forum for the exchange of ideas. That
would run counter to a university's goals of education, diversity,
and tolerance. Rather, the university creates a forum for the dis-
semination of all ideas. As such, the students cannot claim that
they are being forced to associate with particular ideas.
Finally, like the shopping center owner in PruneYard, the stu-
dents can expressly disavow any connection with the distasteful
ideas. Arguably, this point is less powerful here than in the
PruneYard situation. It might be harder, for example, for individ-
62 See text accompanying note 49. In Pacific Gas & Electric, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a public utility commission's order requiring a utility
to place a third party newsletter in its billing envelope. The Court noted that PruneYard
did not raise a "concern that access to [the complex] might affect the shopping center
owner's exercise of his own right to speak. . . ." This distinction applies in the university
fee context as well. The Court reasoned that, unlike the billing envelope at issue in Pacific
Gas & Elec., PruneYard involved an area that was "almost by definition, peculiarly public
in nature." Id. at 12 n.8.
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ual students than for the shopping center owner to post signs that
others can see-the shopping center owner can, for example, place
signs at the entrances to his complex.6 3 Because the other
PruneYard factors weigh heavily against the students, however,
courts should treat the students' argument in the present context
like the position of the shopping center owner in PruneYard.
Under the Prune Yard analysis, mandatory student fees do not vio-
late student objectors' right not to associate since the connection
between the students' funds and a particular belief is not firm
enough to constitute compelled association.
2. The Buckley Analogy-First Amendment Rights in the
Compelled Funding Context. Although PruneYard provides a
good example of an individual compelled to provide a forum for
free expression, the shopping center owner in that case did not
have to fund the speech to which he objected. Pointing to the
heightened scrutiny given to funding in Abood, one still might ar-
gue that Abood rather than PruneYard is the stronger analogy to
the mandatory student fee case and therefore that courts should
invalidate forced contribution to ideological groups as an unconsti-
tutionally compelled affirmation of belief. That claim, however,
overemphasizes the coincidence that both Abood and the
mandatory student fee case involve funding. Two arguments indi-
cate that courts should not read Abood as requiring that courts
strike down mandatory student fees. First, in Buckley v. Valeo,64
the Court upheld a provision of the Federal Election Campaign
Act providing for public financing of election campaigns; thus,
Buckley is closely analogous to university student fee financing of
speech. Second, PruneYard, while not explicitly dealing with the
funding issue, implicitly concluded that the state could compel
property owners to fund a forum for free expression.
Buckley v. Valeo upheld a scheme of Congressional financing
of election campaigns created "to reduce the deleterious influence
of large contributions on our political process, to facilitate commu-
nication by candidates with the electorate, and to free candidates
from the rigors of fundraising. '65 Plaintiffs argued that this scheme
involved a "compulsion upon individuals to finance the dissemina-
tion of ideas with which they disagree." The Court had little pa-
tience for this claim, holding in a single sentence that "[t]he
11 A university might lessen this concern by requiring the organization to indicate that
all students do not share its views.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
65 424 U.S. at 91.
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scheme involved[d] no compulsion."66 According to the Court,
Congress' public financing scheme was an effort "not to abridge,
restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facili-
tate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electo-
ral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.""7 Buckley thus
establishes the principle that the government may tax its citizenry
and use the funds to subsidize a forum for free expression, as long
as it does so in a way that does not invidiously discriminate among
speakers and viewpoints. 8
PruneYard can also be read to establish this principle. In con-
cluding that the state law upheld in Prune Yard was not an uncon-
stitutional taking, the Court conceded that "one of the essential
sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude
others. '6 9 Like the taxpayers in Buckley, therefore, the shopping
center owner in PruneYard effectively surrendered a property
right in order to support views with which he disagreed. Arguably,
the situation in PruneYard differs from the payment of fees in
both Buckley and the mandatory student fee context. Although
the shopping center owner had to lend his property to support
ideas with which he disagreed, he did not actually lose any of his
property.70 But should this distinction make a difference? The im-
portant issue in PruneYard was not whether the state had taken
the shopping center owner's property, but whether the state had
violated the shopping center owner's first amendment rights by
forcing him to make his property available for the propagation of
views with which he disagreed. In holding that the state had not
violated the shopping center owner's right not to associate, the
Court in PruneYard did not rely on the fact that the value of his
property was hardly diminished by his support of the forum.7 1
3. A balancing test. PruneYard and Buckley suggest that
66 Id. at 91 n.124. The Court could have relied on the voluntariness of the taxpayer
checkoff to the election financing fund to conclude that there was "no compulsion." The
Court made clear, however, that its conclusion would have been the same had the election
financing been appropriated by Congress out of general revenues. "The ... check-off is
simply the means by which Congress determines the amount of its appropriation." Id.
67 Id. at 92-93.
68 The Court carefully scrutinized the fairness of the method by which the funds would
be distributed to major, minor and new political parties. Id. at 93-108. See also Pacific Gas
& Electric, 475 U.S. at 25 (Marshall concurring) (mandated funding unconstitutional be-
cause it "burden[ed] the speech of one party in order to enhance the speech of another").
69 447 U.S. at 82.
70 Id. at 83. The PruneYard Court concluded that the right to speak upheld in that
case did not "unreasonably impair the value or use of the[] property as a shopping center."
71 See text quoted at note 61.
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mandated student fees do not constitute compelled association and
therefore do not implicate students' right not to associate. Other
Supreme Court precedent, moreover, suggests that mandated fees
may be constitutional even if the fees burden the right not to asso-
ciate. According to this precedent, such burdens are constitutional
as long as the strength of the government interest outweighs the
burden.
In United States v. Lee,72 the Supreme Court ruled that the
imposition of taxes on a member of the Old Order Amish did not
violate his free exercise rights under the first amendment. The ap-
pellee, a farmer and carpenter, had failed to file quarterly social
security tax returns required of employers and had failed to with-
hold tax from his employees. The IRS assessed the employer for
his unpaid employment taxes.7 3 The employer contended that the
imposition of taxes or receipt of benefits violated Amish religious
beliefs and that compulsory participation in the social security sys-
tem violated the free exercise clause.74
In rejecting this argument, the Court recognized that the
Amish faith and the obligations of a national security system were
in conflict but held that "[n]ot all burdens on religion are uncon-
stitutional. . . .Because the broad public interest in maintaining a
sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict
with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax. 75
In light of a broader public interest, forcing the Amish to contrib-
ute to an entity that they abhorred did not violate their religious
rights."6
72 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
73 Id. at 254.
7' Id. at 257. The Amish are religiously opposed to the national social security system
because they believe it sinful not to provide for their own needy and elderly. Id. at 255.
75 Id. at 257, 260.
7' The balancing test established by Lee seems to mandate that state action "burden-
ing" constitutionally protected liberties satisfy a strict scrutiny test. The Lee Court held
that "[t]he state may justify a limitation on religious liberty [only] by showing that it is
essential to accomplish an overriding government interest." 455 U.S. at 257-58. Despite such
language, Lee, like many other decisions, is more sensibly understood as adopting a balanc-
ing approach which weighs the extent of the burden placed on constitutionally protected
liberty against the strength of the government interest and the degree to which that interest
may be satisfied through means which place less of a burden on the liberty interest.
While the Court has formally adopted a multi-tier system of judicial review, "deviation
from th[is] system has become so common as to render constitutional adjudication a desul-
tory affair." Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the
Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St.L.J. 161, 183 (1984) (discussing cases in which the Court
departed from the multi-tier system). Under its emerging jurisprudence, the Court would
more readily strike down state action placing a great burden on the right not to associate
than state action incidentally burdening this right. Id. at 177-81. Indeed, analysis of the
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Although Lee dealt with conflict between broad social policy
and religious rights, its rationale can be extended to free speech
rights.77 Courts have held that the "[g]overnment may abridge in-
cidentally individual rights of free speech and association when en-
gaged in furthering the constitutional goal of 'uninhibited, robust,
and wide-spread' expression." 1 Certainly, the universities' creation
of a forum for the dissemination of ideas furthers this first amend-
ment ideal. Courts, weighing the potential detriment to this forum
in the absence of mandatory student funding against the tenuous
link between individual students and the ideas expressed by fund-
ing recipients, should conclude that mandatory student fees do not
offend the first amendment.
4. The PruneYard, Buckley, and Lee Framework. The combi-
nation of the PruneYard, Buckley, and Lee decisions provides a
principled and uniform framework for analyzing student fee cases.
First, one looks to the analogy in Prune Yard and Buckley to deter-
mine the extent that student fees infringe, if at all, upon the ob-
jecting students' right not to associate. Second, if one determines
that there is an infringement, the Lee case indicates that
mandatory student fees are not necessarily objectionable. Instead,
at this second stage in the inquiry, a court should find that
mandatory student fees violate dissenting students' first amend-
ment rights only if the infringement on the students' rights not to
associate outweighs the government's interest in causing the
infringement.
Applying this framework, courts should permit universities to
compel payment of student fees. As PruneYard and Buckley indi-
cate, mandatory student fees do not infringe upon the students'
first amendment rights. Even if the fees did implicate the first
amendment, the strong interest in producing educated and toler-
weight of the interest infringed appears to reenter the Court's reasoning in Lee when it
addresses the matter of accommodation: "The Court has long recognized that [a] balance
must be struck between the value of the comprehensive social security system. . . and the
consequences of allowing religiously based exemptions." 455 U.S. at 259.
For opinions questioning the multi-tier system in the equal protection area, see San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973)(Marshall dissenting)(supporting a
weighing of interests); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 478
(1985)(Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part)(same);
id. at 451 (Stevens and Burger concurring)("cases reflect a continuum of judgmental re-
sponses" rather than distinct tiers).
"' For an argument in favor of applying the Lee analogy in student fee cases see Nor-
man L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ide-
ological Non-Association, 36 Rutgers L.Rev. 3, 46-49 (1983).
" Kania, 702 F.2d at 480, quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
Kania cited Buckley v. Valeo as authority for this proposition. 702 F.2d at 480.
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ant students outweighs any slight infringement on students' right
to associate. A harder question is whether a university, once it has
decided to use mandatory fees to fund student groups, must fund
all qualified groups or whether it has discretion in funding such
groups.
IV. MANDATORY FUNDING AND UNIVERSITY DISCRETION
Two legal doctrines are involved when one considers the issue
of whether the university must fund all student groups with its
mandatory student fees. First, one must consider the first amend-
ment public forum doctrine in the university setting. Second, one
must look to the Supreme Court's "subsidy" decisions.
A. The University and the Public Forum Doctrine
A recurring theme of this Comment holds that the university
is a forum for the dissemination of ideas. By ruling that the uni-
versity is a "public forum," the Supreme Court has held that this
characterization of the university atmosphere has constitutional
implications. Since state universities are state controlled institu-
tions built with state money on state property, one might think
that the state has absolute authority to control what speech takes
place there. The Court has held, however, that even on public
property the state has limited authority to regulate speech.
The public forum doctrine delineates the limits of this author-
ity.7 '9 Public fora include those that are traditionally such fora,
such as parks and streets,80 and those that the state has opened to
the public's first amendment activities, such as a school board
meeting or a university.8 1 If public property is deemed a public
79 For a history of the public forum doctrine, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana,
1974 Sup.Ct.Rev. 233.
80 This concept was first expressed by Justice Roberts in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496,
515-16 (1939):
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and ... have been used for purposes of assembly, com-
municating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immuni-
ties, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege ... to use the streets and parks for
communication ... may be regulated in the interest of all ... but it must not, in the
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
8 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)(university); Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin
Emp. Rel. Commn, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meeting). The state is not required to
keep these nontraditional fora open; but as long as it does so, it is bound by those standards
that apply in traditional public fora. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
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forum, the full force of first amendment freedoms apply: "the gov-
ernment may. . . enforce a content-based exclusion . .. [only if
the exclusion] is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.18 2 If public property is
deemed not to be a public forum, the state has greater power to
regulate the speech that takes place there. While content-based
regulation is permissible if it serves to preserve the property for
"its intended purposes," the government still may not suppress
speech simply "because public officials oppose the speaker's
view.""3 Viewpoint discrimination thus is not permitted even in ar-
eas that are not public fora.8 4
Two landmark cases indicate that a university is a public fo-
rum. In Healy v. James5 and Widmar v. Vincent, 6 the Supreme
Court recognized that "the campus of a public university, at least
for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public
forum. '8 7 The plaintiffs in Healy were a group of students wishing
to organize and register as a university organization a lbcal chapter
of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a group known at
the national level as having extreme radical views. The president
of the university refused to allow the group to organize on campus
due to its reputation and because he found its views abhorrent.8 8
The Court ruled that this decision violated the organization's
82 Id. at 45. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), illustrates this
principle. The Court invalidated a Chicago ordinance that prohibited picketing within 150
feet of a school building while the school was in session, except for "peaceful picketing of
any school involved in a labor dispute." Under a stringent standard of review, the Court
held this content-based regulation to be an impermissible distinction between labor picket-
ing and other peaceful picketing.
'3 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
84 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), illustrates this principle. The Court held that
Fort Dix, a federal military reservation devoted primarily to basic training for newly in-
ducted Army personnel, was not a public forum. The government consequently could ban all
speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature in order to further the purpose of
the military installation. The Court upheld this ban, however, only after satisfying itself
that "the military authorities [in no way] discriminated . . .based upon . . . political
views." 424 U.S. at 838-39. See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985) ("Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral."). For a case widening the scope of
first amendment freedoms in nonpublic forums beyond the prohibition of viewpoint dis-
crimination, see Airport Com'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct.
2568 (1987) (applying overbreadth doctrine).
85 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
86 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
87 Id. at 267 n.5. See also Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 ("The college classroom with its sur-
rounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' ").
88 Id. at 178, 187.
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members' right to associate. 9 In holding that the president's disa-
greement with the group's views was insufficient reason to warrant
exclusion from the university forum, the Court reiterated the view
that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is no-
where more vital than in the community of American schools."90
Similarly, in Widmar, the Court rejected a university's at-
tempt to exclude a student religious organization from the univer-
sity forum. The university's stated policy was to encourage student
activities, and it regularly made available its facilities for meetings
of registered student groups.9 1 However, the university refused to
provide facilities for the group in question because of the group's
religious nature.9 2 In holding such an exclusion invalid, the Court
reasoned that having created a forum generally open to student
groups, the university's attempt to enforce a content-based exclu-
sion violated the fundamental principle that state regulation of
speech should be content-neutral.93 To justify such an exclusion,
the university had to show that its action was necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it was narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.9 4 The university failed that test.9 5
Both Widmar and Healy demonstrate that a university is a
public forum; consequently, any exclusion must be closely scruti-
nized. However, neither case held that no regulations may be
placed on a university forum. Although a university is a public fo-
rum, first amendment rights must be applied "in light of the spe-
cial characteristics of the school environment."" Consequently,
8 "Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is the right of individuals to
associate to further their personal beliefs. . . . [This right] has long been held to be implicit
in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition." Id. at 181. See note 7.
90 Id. at 180, quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
91 454 U.S. at 265.
92 The group, Cornerstone, was an evangelical Christian organization which had previ-
ously held meetings on campus. A typical meeting included hymns, prayer, Bible study, and
discussion of religious views and experiences. Id. at 265 n.2.
93 Id. at 277.
Id. at 269-70.
" The Court did not agree with the university's assertion that allowing the religious
group to use campus facilities violated the establishment clause, thus creating a compelling
state interest. The argument advanced by the university and rejected by the Court main-
tained that an equal access policy would have the primary effect of advancing religion. The
Court reasoned that such a policy would not "confer an imprimatur of state approval" on
religion and did not advance a compelling state interest. Id. at 274.
9' Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Recently, the Su-
preme Court used this principle to limit high school students' first amendment rights. In
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. 562 (1988), the Court ruled that high
school officials can censor articles in a curriculum-based student newspaper if such censor-
ship is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at 571. However, the
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both the Widmar and Healy Courts felt that a university had au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with its educa-
tional mission on the use of its campus facilities.97 Such regula-
tions, however, do not allow a university to exclude
discriminatorily speech from the forum.
Widmar and Healy stand for the proposition that a university
cannot prevent a student group from using the university forum
based on the content of the groups' expected speech. Arguably
then, Widmar and Healy can be read to indicate that a university
may not exclude certain groups from university funding because of
what those groups intend to say. Just as the first amendment pro-
hibits selective exclusions from use of the forum's facilities, it also
prohibits selective exclusions from the funding process because
many student groups need university funds to compete effectively
in the marketplace of ideas. For example, if a university chooses
not to fund a student group because other students object to that
group's ideas, it violates the first amendment.
While this argument is appealing to those who feel that all
student groups should have an equal chance to participate in the
forum, Supreme Court doctrine does not clearly resolve this issue
in favor of compelled funding. Allowing groups to exercise their
first amendment rights in the forum and funding such groups in-
volve two slightly different lines of inquiry under Supreme Court
precedent.
B. Student First Amendment Rights and the Subsidy Cases
Where a university selectively excludes a student group from
university funding because other students object to that group's
views, the argument that this practice violates the student organi-
zation's first amendment rights depends on whether the organiza-
tion's members have a right to receive funding. Healy and
Widmar stand for the general proposition that a university cannot
deny student organizations access to the forum; whether students
Court expressly reserved the question of whether such censorship would be legitimate at the
university level. Id. at 571 n.7.
' Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268 n.5 ("A university differs in significant respects from public
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is educa-
tion, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's authority to impose rea-
sonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities.
We have not held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally availa-
ble to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its
grounds or buildings."); Healy, 408 U.S. at 189.
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also have a right to school funds was not decided." However, sev-
eral Supreme Court decisions suggest that student organizations
do not have an absolute right to receive equal university funding.
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation,99 the Supreme
Court held that an organization seeking funding from the federal
government does not have an absolute right to receive funding just
because the government funds other organizations. Taxation With
Representation (TWR) was a nonprofit corporation organized to
promote the public interest in the area of federal taxation. 100 TWR
challenged § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code' 01 which pro-
vided that contributions to an otherwise tax-exempt organization
were not tax deductible if the organization was involved in sub-
stantial lobbying efforts. The organization claimed that this provi-
sion imposed an "unconstitutional condition" on the receipt of tax
deductible contributions, relying on the earlier Supreme Court de-
cision of Speiser v. Randall.02 The plaintiffs also attacked the
statute on equal protection grounds where it permitted certain de-
ductions for contributions to veterans' organizations that engaged
in lobbying but did not allow contributors to deduct donations to
other non-profit lobby organizations. 0 3
Addressing the first amendment challenge, the Taxation
Court distinguished Speiser on the ground that TWR was not be-
ing penalized because of its intention to lobby; rather Congress was
merely refusing to fund the lobbying with public monies. 10, The
Court reasoned that "Congress is not required by the First Amend-
ment to subsidize lobbying," rejecting the "notion that First
Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are
subsidized by the State."'0 5 The Court held that organizations do
" The Court in Healy explicitly left this issue open, stating that "[i]t is unclear on this
record whether recognition also carries with it a right to seek funds from the school budget..
. . [S]ince the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating such funds, we do not
consider possible funding as an associational aspect of nonrecognition in this case." 408 U.S.
at 182 n.8.
99 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
100 Id. at 541.
101 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
102 357 U.S. 513 (1958). Speiser held unconstitutional a California law denying persons
a tax exemption unless they signed a declaration stating that they had never advocated the
violent overthrow of the government. Noting that "[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who
engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech," id. at 518,
the Speiser Court ruled that such a denial imposed an unconstitutional condition on the
exercise of the plaintiffs' first amendment rights.
10' 461 U.S. at 546-47.
104 Id. at 545.
... Id. at 546, citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas
[55:363
Mandatory Student Fees
not have an absolute right to equality in the distribution of govern-
ment funds and that Congress may choose which groups to fund
based on the content of their speech. Importantly, however, the
Court qualified this broad principle by stating that the outcome
would have been different if Congress were to subsidize speech in a
manner that was aimed at the suppression of a particular view-
point or had that effect.106 The government thus is bound to a
"neutral principles" standard in funding decisions.
The Taxation Court also rejected the plaintiffs' equal protec-
tion claim, refusing to apply strict scrutiny because the distinction
between veterans' organizations and other charitable organizations
was not a suspect classification. In rejecting this claim, the Court
did not delineate the extent of Congressional power to discriminate
among speakers, saying only that decisions to fund one speaker
and not another are ordinarily "a matter of policy and discretion
not open to judicial review unless in circumstances which here we
are not able to find. '107
Taxation thus supports two principles relevant to the present
discussion. First, Taxation suggests that courts reviewing a univer-
sity's decisions to fund one student group and not another should
treat the university's funding decisions with a degree of deference
comparable to that which the Taxation Court provided Congress'
classification of public interest groups. Just as Congress has tradi-
tionally enjoyed judicial deference with respect to funding deci-
sions, public universities have received great deference with re-
spect to educational policy decisions. Several courts, including the
Supreme Court, have held that the university has such discretion.
"Within wide limitations a [university] is free to adopt such educa-
tional philosophy as it chooses."108 Discretion as to educational de-
cisions encompasses academic decisions, the initial choice to open
the university as a forum,109 as well as budgetary decisions.110
concurring).
100 Taxation, 461 U.S. at 548. The Court drew this principle from its ruling in Speiser,
where the Court held that the denial of the exemption was "frankly aimed at the suppres-
sion of dangerous ideas." 357 U.S. at 519, quoting American Communications Assn. v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1956).
107 Id. at 549, quoting Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 317 (1937).
V eed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F.Supp. 149, 152 (D.Neb. 1973). The Supreme Court
often has held that academic decisions are to be given great deference. See note 53 and
accompanying text.
10' See note 87. See also Veed, 353 F.Supp. at 152-53 (university practices indicate that
it considers extracurricular activities for students as part of the educational process and
such decisions should be given great deference by the courts).
110 See Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 656 F.Supp. 1045 (W.D.Ark. 1987) (uni-
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Second, and more importantly, the Taxation decision indi-
cates that public universities, like Congress, cannot use funding
decisions in ways that discriminate against particular viewpoints.
Importantly, lower courts have recognized this first amendment
limitation on university funding decisions, ruling that such deci-
sions are bound by the neutral principles standard. A university
cannot take adverse action against a student organization by with-
drawing funds, refusing funds, or changing the funding mechanism
because it disapproves of the organization's speech."'
Unlike the public forum rules which prohibit broad content-
based exclusions, the rule governing funding allocations merely
prohibits discrimination against particular viewpoints. Therefore,
courts must examine the university's action to determine whether
a denial of funds is ultimately viewpoint-based. For example, a
university cannot refuse to fund a school newspaper because it
thought that some of its editorial positions were politically objec-
tionable.11 2 However, a university decision not to fund any political
speech is a decision based upon neutral principles because it does
not discriminate among political viewpoints.
Taxation only establishes a general framework for analyzing
funding decisions. It does not determine definitively whether a uni-
versity may constitutionally deny funding to an organization based
on students' objections. One still must determine whether that de-
cision is based upon neutral principles.
V. LEGITIMACY OF AsSOCIATIONAL CONCERNS AS A REASON FOR
DENYING FUNDING TO STUDENT GROUPS
A. University Denial of Funding for Associational Reasons
Although this Comment has demonstrated that the imposition
of mandatory student fees is unlikely to interfere with students'
associational interests, a university still might choose not to fund a
group if it felt that forcing students to fund such a group would
pose associational risks to individual students. For example, many
versity has discretion in dispersing funds to student groups).
2 See Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279, 282 (8th Cir. 1983) (university cannot change
the funding mechanism of the campus newspaper because it found the paper's content of-
fensive); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (university cannot withdraw
funds from school newspaper because it finds the content of the paper abhorrent); Antonelli
v. Hammond, 308 F.Supp. 1329, 1337-38 (D.Mass. 1970) (university cannot force student
paper to submit its material to newspaper's advisory board by withdrawing funds until
compliance).
112 See Stanley, 719 F.2d at 282.
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students vehemently protest funds allocated to PIRGs. Because of
a PIRG's extremely political nature, n1 a university might refuse to
fund it in deference to objecting students. 4 To determine whether
the refusal to fund the PIRG is legitimate, one must-applying the
framework developed in Part IV of this Comment-determine
whether the university's concern for students' associational rights
is a legitimate motive for selective funding of university groups.
Only one case has dealt specifically with this question. Stanley
v. Magrath 15 presented this issue to the Eighth Circuit. In Stan-
ley, the university changed the funding mechanism of the Minne-
sota Daily, the campus newspaper. This change was prompted by
the publication of the "Humor Issue" which was styled in the form
of a sensationalist newspaper and which contained articles sati-
rizing religion among other things. Because the university regents
"deplor[ed] the content" of the edition, the university instituted a
refundable fee system with regard to the newspaper."" The court
held such a change impermissible because of improper motivation
on the university's part.1 7
The interesting portion of the court's decision is found in its
dicta. The Eighth Circuit adopted the finding of the district court
that "[o]ne of the motivations for the establishment of the refund-
able fee system was to respond to the concerns of those students
who objected to being coerced into giving financial support to the
Daily." The court indicated that if this had been the only reason
for the university's action, the change of funding might have been
a permissible exercise of discretion. Interestingly, the Court did
not discuss the subsidy cases; its only pronouncement on the mat-
Is PIRGs are especially active in the areas of research, lobbying, and advocacy for so-
cial change. See Galda, 772 F.2d at 1061. For a more thorough discussion of the nature of
PIRGs, see Estelle A. Fishbein, Legal Aspects of Student Activity Fees, 1 J.Col. & Uni.L.
190 (1974).
114 Often, the fees contributed to PIRGs are made refundable for this reason. Fishbein,
1 J.Col. & Uni.L. at 192. Note that a university might refuse to fund a PIRG on the basis of
a neutral principle. For example, a university might choose never to fund a private corpora-
tion "which is neither under the control nor supervision of the university and which does
not operate as a university-related educational, social, or recreational program." Id. In such
a case, a court must decide whether this decision "is in reality a facade for viewpoint-based
discrimination." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985).
ns 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983). In Maryland Public Interest Research v. Elkins, the
court offhandedly referred to student associational concerns as a reason for a university's
decision not to fund a PIRG's litigation expense, but it did not discuss the issue. 565 F.2d
864, 867 (4th Cir. 1977).
"' Stanley, 719 at 280-81.
217 Id. at 284.
218 Id. at 283.
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ter was that "[a]s far as the First Amendment is concerned, the
University could certainly choose not to own or support any news-
papers, so long as its motivation is permissible."' .
At first glance, the Stanley dicta might seem consistent with
the ruling in Taxation that, absent an impermissible discrimina-
tion which either aims at or has the effect of suppressing a particu-
lar viewpoint, the state can allocate funds as it wishes. Denials of
funds premised upon concern over students' right not to associate
do not appear to be aimed at suppressing a particular viewpoint.
The university is merely respecting students' views that they
should not be forced to subsidize such speech. Thus, in the PIRG
example above, it seems that the university could rightly refuse
funding. On closer examination, however, it appears that courts
should not accept as legitimate a university's desire to respect the
associational rights of some of its students by silencing a particular
speaker.
B. Legitimacy of the University's Motive
Although the Stanley decision may seem consistent with the
Supreme Court's subsidy cases, one nevertheless can argue that the
principles of those cases are not satisfied when a university official
denies funding based upon students' right not to associate. While a
concern for the associational rights of students is facially view-
point-neutral, the resulting funding allocation rule is content-
based, not content-neutral.
As Taxation makes clear, not all such content-based allocation
schemes are unconstitutional. A court must determine whether the
scheme is a facade for viewpoint discrimination. The law in this
area is still in its early stages of development; courts have not yet
determined what content-based subsidies constitute viewpoint dis-
crimination. Content-based allocation schemes are not all equally
... Id. at 283 n.6 In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Supreme Court
suggested that it was impermissible to look into the government's motive when determining
whether a statute violates the first amendment. In upholding a law prohibiting the knowing
destruction of draft cards-even as symbolic speech-the Court stated that "the purpose of
Congress ... is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional." Id. at 383. Al-
though O'Brien seems to preclude an inquiry into motive, it has not been followed consist-
ently. The Court often looks to motivation to determine the constitutionality of government
action. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811 ("existence of reasonable grounds for limiting
access to a nonpublic forum ...will not save a regulation that is in reality a facade for
viewpoint-based discrimination"); Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977) (termination of teacher for permissible reasons unconstitutional if partly moti-
vated by desire to punish exercise of first amendment rights).
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suspicious. A university rule barring funding for all political speak-
ers, for example, seems less suspicious than a rule barring funding
for all speakers who discuss the university's investments in South
Africa.
This Comment, for two reasons, argues that courts should hold
unconstitutional university funding allocations based only upon
concern for the associational rights of students who object to fund-
ing certain groups. First, although neutral reasons ostensibly moti-
vate such decisions, they allow private biases to deter free speech.
Second, such exclusions from funding undercut the ideals of toler-
ance and free intellectual exchange that the university has histori-
cally facilitated.
1. Private Biases as Non-Neutral Standards of Decision.
Whether a university can deny funding because of its students' as-
sociational concerns depends on whether such a criterion is "neu-
tral"-i.e., it is not aimed at suppressing a particular viewpoint.
Decisions like the one posited in Stanley are only superficially
neutral. Although framed in terms of "students' associational con-
cerns" such decisions actually give effect to students' prejudices.
While democracy is theoretically predicated on the reflection
of individuals' private preferences in government decision mak-
ing, 12 the government cannot in some instances use those prefer-
ences to impair other rights. The Supreme Court has held that
"neutral criteria" that give effect to private prejudices are not con-
stitutionally permissible if the result is an infringement of an-
other's fundamental rights. The Court has ruled in the first
amendment context that private biases cannot be used as a pre-
mise for suppressing speech. In the "hostile audience" cases, the
Supreme Court consistently has held that a hostile audience reac-
tion to a particular speaker is an insufficient reason to suppress
that speaker.12 1
Generally, the hostile audience cases involve enforcement of a
state statute or a common law charge of breach of the peace
against speakers who allegedly "stirred people to anger, invited
public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest."' 2 Keeping
the peace is a legitimate and "neutral" motive for governmental
120 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum.L.Rev. 873, 900 (1987) ("public
and private law generally take private preferences as the appropriate basis for social
choice").
121 See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
1M Edwards, 372 U.S. at 238, quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
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action; yet, the Court has struck down these laws arguing that they
infringe the plaintiffs' free speech rights because the laws make
"criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views."'21 3 Although
the laws in hostile audience cases have a goal other than the sup-
pression of speech, the Court has held that these laws amount to
governmental suppression of speech. Essentially, the Court has
reasoned that the government cannot give effect to private biases
that result in the infringement of one's fundamental rights.
More recently, in the equal protection context, the Supreme
Court has stated this principle explicitly. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 24
the Court struck down a lower court ruling that denied a divorced
woman custody of her child because the woman had married a
black man. The lower court had reasoned that the child might be
adversely affected by living in a mixed-race household; thus, it was
in the child's "best interest" to reside with her father. The Court
struck down the custody ruling:
[t]he Constitution cannot control [racial] prejudices but
neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect.12 5
Ostensibly neutral criteria must fall when they give effect to
prejudices that infringe upon others' constitutional rights.'26
The principle of the hostile audience cases and Palmore pro-
vides a basis for holding unconstitutional university decisions that
cut off funding of a particular student organization because of a
concern for students' associational freedoms. Such a decision in ef-
fect penalizes student organizations for "unpopular views." It facil-
itates private prejudices that are aimed at suppressing a particular
viewpoint. 127 Although, under Taxation, funds may be denied to
123 Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237.
124 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
125 Id. at 433.
26 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court there refused to enforce an
ostensibly neutral rule of law-that restrictive covenant agreements are enforcea-
ble-because of the inequality inherent in such enforcement. Unequal enforcement is due
not to a state decision to harm blacks but to the racial animus of those who draft racial
covenants. See also David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup.Ct.Rev. 99,
130-4 (inadequacy of racially neutral statutes suggests that affirmative action sometimes
may be constitutionally mandated).
27 The denial of funds to a university organization has a more acute effect than similar
action against an organization in the real world. Students are notoriously short of time and
money. The little they have in the way of energy and funds is often devoted to other func-
tions. Under such conditions, the selective denial of funding can substantially deter speech.
See, e.g., Kania, 702 F.2d at 477 ("undisputed evidence show[s] that without partial funding
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achieve viewpoint-neutral goals, student associational concerns
cannot justify a selective withdrawl of funding: state classifications
based upon student preferences legitimate and enforce student
hostility toward unpopular viewpoints.128
2. Upholding University Ideals. A second consideration sup-
ports the conclusion that courts should apply strict scrutiny when
reviewing a university's decision not to fund a particular student
group due to a concern for the associational rights of objecting stu-
dents. A major theme of this Comment has been that the univer-
sity setting is particularly suited to the expression of dissenting
viewpoints. Such an atmosphere of expression forces students to
consider new ideas and accept, reject, or-at a minimum-tolerate
those ideas. A university seriously undercuts this atmosphere if it
allows students to determine whether a group deserves funding
based upon their disdain for its ideology. University accommoda-
tion of students' objections would suggest that its teachings of tol-
erance regarding minority viewpoints are wholly a facade. Such ac-
commodations necessarily encourage the "standardization of ideas
• . . by dominant political groups' 119 against which the Supreme
Court has fought.
Moreover, as the Stanley decision illustrates, the motive be-
hind a particular funding decision may be difficult to discern. Even
in those cases where the court finds a permissible motive, it is pos-
sible that this seemingly innocent motive masks a more invidious
one. As long as a university official °30 can hide her reaction to a
group's speech, she permissibly can withdraw funds from student
organizations on the premise that other students' associational
by the student fees [the campus newspaper] could not survive in its present form").
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Taxation supports this argument. There, §
501(c)(4) of the tax statute allowed an organization denied benefits under § 501(c)(3) to
create an affiliate that could pursue lobbying activities. According to Justice Blackmun, this
alone saved the statute from unconstitutionality because it created a channel through which
the denied organizations could speak. Any restriction on an organization's § 501(c)(4) activi-
ties would render the statute unconstitutional because it effectively would deny benefits to
an organization choosing to exercise its first amendment rights. 461 U.S. at 552-553.
128 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
Colum.L.Rev. 1689, 1710-16 (1984)(arguing for control of majoritarian power in the equal
protection context); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53
U.Chi.L.Rev. 1129, 1135 (1986)(discussing legitimate limitations on use of private prefer-
ences in public policy).
Terminielio v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
110 Some universities allocate funds through student government committees rather
than through the administrative system. Regardless of who allocates the funds, it must be
done according to neutral principles. Whoever is responsible for the allocation must ensure
that her personal motives are not affecting her decision.
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rights are drawn into question.
This concern should be taken seriously in light of the numer-
ous instances where school officials have attempted to suppress
students' speech in the past.13 1 It is the natural reaction of many
people to want suppressed those ideas they find abhorrent.132 A
university official is no different. Although the university is pre-
mised upon the notion that the exchange of ideas should be pro-
tected, a university official is only human.
3. University Discretion. The arguments made here regarding
private prejudices and tolerance are not meant to undercut en-
tirely university discretion. A university must retain its flexibility
in making funding decisions; it would otherwise have no ability
usefully to dispense funds. This Comment merely suggests that
this discretion is limited; it does not suggest that a university lacks
discretion as to the amount of funds given to student groups. As
long as funding decisions are not aimed at suppressing a particular
viewpoint, directly or indirectly, such decisions are clearly within
the university's power and do not undercut its model of tolerance.
For example, university officials might decide that the univer-
sity will fund only those groups that have a faculty advisor. The
university might also decide to base its funding on the number of
students involved in the organization. Alternatively, the university
could look to the needs of the different groups: a university news-
paper may need more money than a group hosting one speaker per
semester. Such criteria are reasonable and do not infringe on stu-
dents' first amendment rights. Although these requirements may
affect the group's speech, they are constitutional because they are
not aimed at suppressing any particular viewpoint.'33 Rather, such
a requirement is akin to the content-neutral regulations that a uni-
versity is allowed to impose upon the use of its forum.13 4 Also, this
requirement does not undercut a university's atmosphere of toler-
ance because it does not send conflicting messages to students.
In a somewhat different vein, the university might also decide
not to fund any political groups at all. While this exclusion is
131 See, e.g., Healy, 408 U.S. 169 (university president denied recognition to student
groups because he disagreed with its views); Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (ban on wearing of black
armbands protesting the Vietnam War).
132 See Bollinger, The Tolerant Society at 109 (cited in note 28) ("It is a tendency of
human nature to overreact in the use of legal restraints of speech.").
131 Of course, the university must be willing to provide an advisor to all groups request-
ing one; it could not deny a group an advisor because it did not approve of that group's
speech.
134 See note 81 and accompanying text.
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based upon the content of a group's speech it is not unconstitu-
tional because it excludes all political groups, not just those with a
particular viewpoint. The distinction between political and
nonpolitical groups may be extremely difficult to make.3 5 Some
universities nonetheless might decide that its resources are better
channeled into scholarly or entertainment-oriented speech, or stu-
dent services such as hospitals or counselling services. Such a deci-
sion has an adverse impact upon those excluded groups but it is
not unconstitutional or necessarily out of step with a university's
mission. This Comment argues not that all student organizations
should receive funds but that all organizations should be allowed
to compete for funds on an equal footing regardless of what they
intend to say.
CONCLUSION
The democratic ideal is an integral part of the university set-
ting. As such, the university should do everything in its power to
ensure that students' first amendment rights are protected.
Equally important is the participation of students in the exchange
of ideas. A university has discretion to choose how it wishes to pro-
mote this model. If it chooses to mandate fees to support student
groups, it may do so. In some instances, it may be barred from
denying funding to ensure that an intolerant student faction does
not undercut the "marketplace of ideas." In a world of increasing
student apathy and intolerance,"3 6 such a model may be the only
way to ensure that students retain the capacity for self-criticism
and doubt that mark the "tolerant mind sought through free
speech.'3
7
13' For example, would a typical school newspaper be characterized as political or
nonpolitical? One sees the difficulty in answering this question when one examines the
many cases involving protests against fees used to fund newspapers espousing views with
which some students disagree.
1S See generally Bloom, American Mind at 47-137 (cited in note 28).
"" Bollinger, The Tolerant Society at 247 (cited in note 28).
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